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Abstract
In this study, we examine the e¤ects of capital taxation on innovation and economic
growth in an R&D-based growth model. We nd that capital taxation has drastically
di¤erent e¤ects in the short run and in the long run. An increase in the capital income
tax rate has both a consumption e¤ect and a tax-shifting e¤ect on the equilibrium
growth rates of technology and output. In the short run, the consumption e¤ect domi-
nates the tax-shifting e¤ect causing an initial negative e¤ect of capital taxation on the
equilibrium growth rates. However, in the long run, the tax-shifting e¤ect becomes the
dominant force yielding an overall positive e¤ect of capital taxation on steady-state
economic growth. These contrasting e¤ects of capital taxation at di¤erent time hori-
zons may provide a theoretical explanation for the mixed evidence in the empirical
literature on capital taxation and economic growth.
Keywords: Capital taxation, economic growth, R&D, transition dynamics
JEL classication: H20, O30, O40
1 Introduction
In this study, we examine the e¤ects of capital taxation on innovation and economic growth
in an R&D-based growth model. In the literature of endogenous growth, one of the major
issues is whether capital taxation stimulates or impedes growth. Earlier studies employing
an AK-type endogenous growth model show that the impact of raising the capital tax rate
on long-run economic growth is negative (Judd, 1985; Chamley, 1986; King and Rebelo,
1990; Rebelo, 1991; Jones et al., 1993; Pecorino, 1993, 1994; Devereux and Love, 1994;
Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini, 1998), although the quantitative magnitude could be negligibly
small (Lucas, 1990; Stokey and Rebelo, 1995).1 The intuition of this negative growth e¤ect
of capital taxation is that a higher capital tax rate discourages the accumulation of physical
capital and is therefore detrimental to economic growth. However, on the empirical side,
the results are rather inconclusive. Although some empirical studies have found that capital
taxation, such as corporate prot tax and capital gains tax, can be harmful to economic
growth, other empirical studies have found a neutral or even positive e¤ect of capital taxation
on growth.2
While capital accumulation is undoubtedly an important engine of economic growth,
technological progress driven by innovation and R&D also acts as an important driver for
growth; see Aghion and Howitt (2009, p.109) for a discussion on data from OECD countries.3
Therefore, we use the seminal innovation-driven growth model in Romer (1990), which is
a workhorse model in R&D-based growth theory that features both capital accumulation
and endogenous technological progress, to explore both the short-run and long-run e¤ects of
capital taxation on innovation and economic growth. In our analysis, we consider di¤erent
tax-shifting schemes. Specically, we examine the growth e¤ects of capital taxation with tax
shifting from lump-sum tax and also labor income tax to capital income tax.
In the case of tax shifting from lump-sum tax to capital income tax, an increase in
the capital tax rate leads to a decrease in the steady-state equilibrium growth rate via a
consumption e¤ect of capital taxation. Intuitively, a higher capital tax rate causes households
to decrease their saving rate and increase their consumption rate, which in turn leads to an
increase in leisure and a decrease in labor supply. Given that labor is a factor input for
R&D, a smaller labor supply gives rise to a lower growth rate of technology, which in turn
determines the long-run growth rates of output and capital.
1Other than focusing on the long-run growth e¤ect, Frankel (1998) studies the dynamics of capital taxation
during the transition process.
2See Huang and Frentz (2014) for a recent survey that provides a concise summary of the contrasting
empirical ndings in the literature.
3Aghion and Howitt (2009, p.108) report that TFP growth accounts for about two-thirds of economic
growth in OECD countries, while capital deepening accounts for one third.
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In the case of tax shifting from labor income tax to capital income tax, an increase in
the capital tax rate leads to an increase in the steady-state equilibrium growth rate via a
tax-shifting e¤ect of capital taxation. Intuitively, an increase in the capital income tax rate
allows the labor income tax rate to decrease, which in turn leads to a decrease in leisure
and an increase in labor supply. The larger labor supply gives rise to higher growth rates of
technology, output and even capital despite the lower capital-investment rate caused by the
higher capital tax rate. Although the previously mentioned consumption e¤ect of capital
taxation is also present, it is dominated by the tax-shifting e¤ect in the long run. However,
we nd that the relative magnitude of these two e¤ects becomes very di¤erent in the short
run.
We calibrate the model to aggregate data in the US to provide a quantitative analysis
on the dynamic e¤ects of capital taxation on economic growth. We consider the case of
tax shifting from labor income tax to capital income tax and nd that an increase in the
capital tax rate leads to a short-run decrease in the equilibrium growth rates of technology
and output and a gradual convergence to the higher long-run growth rates of technology and
output. The reason for these contrasting short-run and long-run e¤ects is that the consump-
tion e¤ect of capital taxation is relatively strong in the short run. Intuitively, an increase
in the capital income tax rate leads to a decrease in the steady-state equilibrium capital-
technology ratio. Before the economy reaches this new steady-state capital-technology ratio,
households drastically cut down their saving rate below its new steady-state level, which in
turn increases their consumption rate substantially. This substantial increase in consumption
leads to a substantial increase in leisure and a substantial decrease in labor supply, which
in turn reduces temporarily the equilibrium growth rates of technology and output. In the
long run, the e¤ect of a lower wage-income tax rate becomes the dominant force and instead
raises the supply of labor, which in turn increases the steady-state equilibrium growth rates
of technology and output.
Our paper is most closely related to recent studies on taxation and economic growth in
the R&D-based growth model. Zeng and Zhang (2002) show that the long-run growth rate
is independent of labor income tax and consumption tax but decreasing in capital income
tax. In contrast, Lin and Russo (1999) analyze how the taxation of di¤erent sources of
capital income a¤ects long-run growth and nd that a higher capital income tax rate for
innovative rms could be growth-enhancing if the tax system permits tax credits for R&D
spending. Moreover, by focusing on the stability analysis of equilibria, Haruyama and Itaya
(2006) also show that the growth e¤ect of taxing capital income is positive when the economy
exhibits indeterminacy. Although these two papers nd that capital taxation and economic
growth may exhibit a positive relationship, our paper departs from them in highlighting the
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contrasting dynamic e¤ects of capital taxation on economic growth. More recently, Aghion et
al. (2013) and Hong (2014) adopt a quality-ladder R&D-based growth model to investigate
optimal capital taxation. Their primary focus, however, is on the normative analysis with
respect to the Chamley-Judd (Chamley 1986; Judd 1985) result (i.e., the optimal capital
tax is zero), while the present paper focuses on the positive analysis regarding the growth
e¤ect of capital taxation. Furthermore, their analysis does not deal with the case in which
innovation is driven by R&D labor (e.g., scientists and engineers). When R&D uses labor
as the factor input, we nd that the e¤ects of capital taxation are drastically di¤erent at
di¤erent time horizons. This nding may provide a plausible explanation for the mixed
evidence in the empirical literature on capital taxation and economic growth. Finally, we
consider a number of extensions to the benchmark model in order to examine the robustness
of our results.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic
model structure. In Section 3, we investigate the growth e¤ects of capital taxation. In
Section 4, we calibrate the model to provide a quantitative analysis of capital taxation. In
Section 5, we explore a number of extensions. Concluding remarks are provided in Section
6.
2 The model
The model that we consider is an extension of the seminal workhorse R&D-based growth
model from Romer (1990).4 In the Romer model, R&D investment creates new varieties
of intermediate goods. We extend the model by introducing endogenous labor supply and
distortionary income taxes. In what follows, we describe the model structure in turn.
2.1 Household
The economy is inhabited by a representative household. Population is stationary and nor-
malized to unity. The household has one unit of time that can be allocated between leisure
4In the case of extending the model into a scale-invariant semi-endogenous growth model as in Jones
(1995), the long-run growth e¤ect of capital taxation simply becomes a level e¤ect. In other words, instead
of increasing (decreasing) the growth rate of technology, capital taxation increases (decreases) the level of
technology in the long run.
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and production. The representative households lifetime utility is given as:5
U =
Z 1
0
e t[lnCt + (1  Lt)] dt, (1)
where the parameter  > 0 is the households subjective discount rate and the parameter
 > 0 determines the disutility of labor supply. The utility is increasing in consumption Ct
and decreasing in labor supply Lt 2 (0; 1).
The representative household maximizes its lifetime utility subject to6
_K + _a = ra+ (1  K)rKK + (1  L)wL  C   Z. (2)
The variable K denotes the stock of physical capital. The variable a (= V A) denotes the
value of equity shares of monopolistic rms, in which A is the number of monopolistic rms
and V is the value of each rm. w is the wage rate. r is the real interest rate, whereas
rK is the capital rental rate.7 The rates of return on the two assets, physical capital and
equity shares, must follow a no-arbitrage condition r = (1   K)rK in equilibrium. The
policy instrument Z is a lump-sum tax.8 The other policy instruments fL; Kg < 1 are
respectively the labor and capital income tax rates.9
By solving the households optimization problem, we can easily derive the typical Keynes-
Ramsey rules:
_C
C
= (1  K)rK   , (3)
and also the optimality condition for labor supply, which is in the form of a horizontal labor
supply curve given the quasi-linear utility function in (1):
w = C=(1  L). (4)
5To make our analysis tractable, we specify a quasi-linear utility function. As pointed out by Hansen
(1985) and Rogerson (1988), the linearity in work hours may be justied as capturing indivisible la-
bor. To examine the robustness of our results, we will consider a more general utility function U =R1
0
e t
h
lnCt + 
(1 Lt)1 
1 
i
dt in the quantitative analysis in Section 4 and also an alternative iso-elastic
utility function U =
R1
0
e t [Ct(1 Lt)
 ]1  1
1  dt in Section 5.1.
6For notational simplicity, we drop the time subscript.
7For simplicity, we assume zero capital depreciation rate.
8We allow for the presence of a lump tax simply to explore the implications of di¤erent tax-shifting
schemes. Our main results focus on the more realistic case of Z = 0.
9In our analysis, we focus on the case in which K > 0; see for example Zeng and Zhang (2007) and Chu
et al. (2016), who examine the e¤ects of subsidy policies in the R&D-based growth model.
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2.2 Final goods
There is a single nal good Y , which is produced by combining labor and a continuum of
intermediate goods, according to the following aggregator:
Y = L1 Y
Z A
0
xi di, (5)
where LY is the labor input in nal goods production, xi for i 2 [0; A] is the intermediate good
of type i, and A is the number of varieties of intermediate goods. The nal good is treated
as the numeraire, and hence in what follows its price is normalized to unity. We assume that
the nal goods sector is perfectly competitive. Prot maximization of the nal goods rms
yields the following conditional demand functions for labor input and intermediate goods:
LY = (1  )Y=w, (6)
xi = LY (=pi)
1
1  , (7)
where pi is the price of xi relative to nal goods.
2.3 Intermediate goods
Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolist who owns a perpetually protected
patent for that good. Following Romer (1990), capital is the factor input for producing
intermediate goods, and the technology is simply a linear one-to-one function. That is, the
production function is expressed as xi = ki, where ki is the capital input used by intermediate
rm i. Accordingly, the prot of intermediate goods rm i is:
i = pixi   rKki. (8)
Prot maximization subject to the conditional demand function for intermediate goods rm
i yields the following markup-pricing rule:
pi =
rK

> rK . (9)
Equation (9) implies that the level of price is the same across intermediate goods rms. Based
on equation (7) and the production function xi = ki, we have a symmetric equilibrium among
intermediate rms; i.e., xi = x and ki = k. Then, we can obtain the following prot function
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of intermediate goods rms:
i =  =
(1  )Y
A
. (10)
2.4 R&D
In the R&D sector, the familiar no-arbitrage condition for the value of a variety V is:
rV =  + _V . (11)
Equation (11) states that, for each variety, the rate of return on an invention must be equal
to the sum of the monopolistic prot and capital gain (or loss) . As in Romer (1990), labor
is the factor input of R&D. The innovation function of new varieties is given by:
_A = ALA, (12)
where  > 0 is the R&D productivity parameter and LA denotes R&D labor. Given free
entry into the R&D sector, the zero-prot condition of R&D is
_AV = wLA , AV = w. (13)
2.5 Government
The government collects taxes, including capital income tax, labor income tax, and lump-
sum tax, to nance its public spending. At any instant of time, the government budget
constraint can be expressed as:
KrKK + LwL+ Z = G. (14)
The variable G denotes government spending. To ensure balanced growth, we assume G to
be a xed proportion  2 (0; 1) of nal output such that
G = Y . (15)
2.6 Aggregation
Since the intermediate rms are symmetric, the total amount of capital is K = Aki = Ak.
Given xi = ki, xi = x, ki = k, and K = Ak, the nal output production function in equation
(5) can then be expressed as:
Y = A1 KL1 Y : (16)
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After some calculations using equations (2), (6), (7), (11)-(14), and (16), we can derive the
resource constraint in this economy:
_K = Y   C  G: (17)
2.7 Decentralized equilibrium and the balanced-growth path
The decentralized equilibrium is a time path of allocations fC;K ;A;Y ;L;LY ;LA; x ;Gg1t=0,
prices fw; r; rK ; pi; V g1t=0, and policies fK ; L;Zg, such that at any instant of time:
a households maximize lifetime utility (1) taking prices and policies as given;
b competitive nal goods rms choose fx; LY g to maximize prot taking prices as given;
c monopolistic intermediate rms i 2 [0; A] choose fki; pig to maximize prot taking rK
as given;
d R&D rms choose LA to maximize prot taking fV;wg as given;
e the market for nal goods clears, i.e., _K = Y   C  G;
f the labor market clears, i.e., L = LA + LY ;
g the government budget constraint is balanced, i.e., KrKK + LwL+ Z = G.
The balanced growth path is characterized by a set of constant growth rates of all eco-
nomic variables. Let  denote the growth rate of technology and a ~over the variable
denote its steady-state value. It can be shown that along the balanced growth path, we have
_K
K
=
_Y
Y
=
_C
C
=
_w
w
=
_A
A
= ~, _L = _LY = _LA = 0.
3 Long-run growth e¤ects of capital taxation
In this section we examine the growth e¤ects of the capital tax rate. In general, to maintain
a constant proportion of government spending, raising the capital tax is accompanied by a
reduction in another tax. As revealed in equation (14), this can be either a reduction in the
lump-sum tax (if it is available) or a reduction in the labor income tax (if the lump-sum tax
is not available).10 In the analysis that follows, we deal with each of the two scenarios in
turn.
10Note that we assume a xed proportion of government spending G in (15). Therefore, if we want to
examine the e¤ect of a change in K without changing L (Section 3.1), we have to assume that Z adjusts
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3.1 Tax shifting from lump-sum tax to capital income tax
Equipped with the denition of the decentralized equilibrium in Section 2.7 and dening
! = w=A, c = C=A and z = Z=A, we can express the steady-state equilibrium conditions as
follows:
~ = (1  K)~rK   ; (18a)
~! = ~c=(1  L); (18b)
~LY = (1  )~x ~L1 Y =~!; (18c)
~x = ~LY (
2=~rK)
1=(1 ); (18d)
~r = ~LY ; (18e)
~r = (1  K)~rK ; (18f)
~ = ~LA; (18g)
~L = ~LY + ~LA; (18h)
~ = (1  )~x 1 ~L1 Y   ~c=~x; (18i)
K~rK ~x+ L~! ~L+ ~z = ~x
 ~L1 Y ; (18j)
in which ten equations are used to solve ten unknowns ~, ~rK , ~LY , ~LA, ~L, ~!, ~c, ~x, ~r and ~z. We
briey discuss how we obtain equations (18). (18a) is derived from the usual Keynes-Ramsey
rule (3). (18b) is derived from the optimality condition for labor supply (4). (18c) and (18d)
are respectively the demand functions for nal-goods labor and intermediate goods, (6) and
(7). (18e) is derived from inserting _V = 0 into the no-arbitrage condition in the R&D sector
(11), and by using (6), (10) and (13). (18f) is the no-arbitrage condition of asset. (18g) is
derived from the innovation function of varieties (12). (18h) is the labor-market clearing
condition. (18i) is derived from dividing both sides of the resource constraint (17) by A and
using the condition Ax = K. (18j) is derived from dividing both sides of the government
constraint (14) by A and using the condition G = Y .
We rst use (18a), (18e), (18f)-(18h) to eliminate f~r; ~; ~rKg and express f~LY ; ~LAg as
functions of ~L given by
~LY =
~L+ =
1 + 
,
~LA =
~L  =
1 + 
.
endogenously to balance the budget. Doing so also enables us to make a fair comparison between two tax-
shifting regimes: one is from Z to K and the other is from L to K . In the case where tax shifts from L
to K (Section 3.2), L adjusts endogenously and thus the role of the lump-sum tax Z becomes irrelevant.
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These two equations indicate a positive relationship between f~LA; ~LY g and ~L. Moreover,
from the previous condition for ~LA, we can derive the condition ~ = (~L   )=(1 + ),
which shows that the steady-state equilibrium growth rate of technology is increasing in ~L.
Thus, we have
sgn

@~
@K

= sgn
 
@ ~LA
@K
!
= sgn
 
@ ~L
@K
!
. (19)
Accordingly, to investigate the growth e¤ect of the capital tax rate, it is convenient to draw
an inference from examining the e¤ect of the capital tax rate on labor ~L.
We now derive an equilibrium expression of labor ~L. By using (8) and (9), we have
 = ( 1

  1)~rKK=A. This expression together with (10) implies that rKK = 2Y . Then,
dividing both sides of (17) by Y yields
~
K
Y
= 1     C
Y
.
By inserting C=Y = (1 L)(1 )=(~LY ), which is derived from (4) and (6), and rKK = 2Y
into the above equation and using (18e), (18f) and (18g) along with the conditions for ~LY
and ~LA, we can obtain the following equation with one unknown ~L:
1  (1 + )
(~L+ =)

2(1  K) = 1     (1  L)(1  )(1 + )
(~L+ =)
.
Simplifying this equation yields
~L =
1
1  (K)

1  L

  (1  K)
(1  )



  

, (20)
where (K)  ( 2K)=(1 2) is a composite parameter and L is an exogenous policy
parameter. Then, from equation (20), we can obtain the following relationship:
@ ~L
@K
=   
2
(1  2)[1  (K)]2

1  L

  (1  K)
(1  )


  [1  (K)]1 + 




,
which can be further simplied to11
@ ~L
@K
=  [(1 + )
~LA + 2=]
(1  2)[1  (K)] < 0. (21)
11The following reasoning ensures that 1 (K) = [1     2(1  K)]=(1  2) > 0. The steady-state
consumption-output ratio is C=Y = 1     2(1  K) + 2(1  K)=(e + ). Therefore, lim!0 C=Y =
1     2(1  K). In other words, one can restrict 1  (K) > 0 by appealing to the fact that C=Y > 0
for all values of .
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From (19) and (21), we have established the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In the case of tax shifting from lump-sum tax to capital income tax, raising
the capital income tax rate reduces the steady-state equilibrium growth rate.
Equation (19) is the key to understanding Proposition 1. It essentially says that the
e¤ect of the capital tax rate on long-run growth hinges on its e¤ect on labor ~L. When the
capital tax rate is higher, households tend to reduce their investment rate and increase their
consumption rate C=Y . The increase in consumption raises leisure and reduces labor supply,
by shifting up the horizontal labor supply curve. To see this, we have w=Y = 
1 LC=Y from
(4), which shows that an increase in the consumption rate C=Y raises w=Y . Then, from
(6), we see that LY in w=Y = (1 )=LY is decreasing in w=Y . Similarly, from (13), we see
that LA in w=Y =
(1 )
+LA
is also decreasing in w=Y . Therefore, a higher capital tax rate
reduces the equilibrium levels of labor input, R&D labor and economic growth.
As a useful comparison, we can also examine the long-run growth e¤ect of labor taxation.
In so doing, we rst obtain @ ~L
@L
< 0 from equation (20). This result, together with ~ = (~L 
)=(1 +), means that increasing the labor taxation (in the case of a tax shift from a lump-
sum tax to a labor income tax) reduces long-run growth. The intuition is clear. A capital
tax mainly a¤ects the intertemporal choice between consumption and savings (investment),
whereas a labor tax directly a¤ects the intratemporal choice between consumption (working)
and leisure. When the labor tax rate is higher, households tend to reduce their labor supply
and increase their leisure. This in turn reduces the labor supply allocated to the R&D sector
and ultimately the long-run growth rate.
3.2 Tax shifting from labor income tax to capital income tax
A lump-sum tax is not a realistic description in most economies. In this subsection, we
therefore set aside the possibility of a lump-sum tax and deal with the more realistic case
in which a rise in the capital tax rate is coupled with a reduction in another distortionary
tax. This kind of tax shifting has been extensively investigated in the literature on factor
taxation; see e.g., Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), Niepelt (2004), Aghion et al. (2013) and
Chen and Lu (2013). Under such a situation we drop ~z from the model in this subsection.
Thus, equation (18j) is rewritten as:
K~rK ~x+ ~L~! ~L = ~x
 ~L1 Y . (22)
It is useful to note that in (22) the labor income tax rate ~L becomes an endogenous variable
because it needs to adjust in response to a change in the capital tax rate.
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The macroeconomy is now described by (18a)-(18i) and (22) from which we solve for ten
unknowns ~, ~rK , ~LY , ~LA, ~L, ~!, ~c, ~x, ~r and ~L. By arranging (22) with (6), (16), (18c) and
the condition rKK = 2Y , we can obtain
~L =
(   2K)
1  
~LY
~L
=

1 +

~L

(K),
where the second equality uses ~LY = (~L+=)=(1+). Using the above condition and (20),
we can solve the two unknowns f~L; ~Lg and obtain the following quadratic equation:


~L2  



  1  (1  K)
(1  )[1  (K)]

~L+
(K)
[1  (K)] = 0.
This quadratic equation has two solutions, denoted as ~L1 and ~L2, which are given by:
~L1 =
B(K) +
p
B(K)2   4(K)=f[1  (K)]g
2=
, (23a)
~L2 =
B(K) 
p
B(K)2   4(K)=f[1  (K)]g
2=
, (23b)
where B(K)     1  (1 K)(1 )[1 (K)] is a composite parameter.12
To ensure that ~L is positive, we assume that the set of parameters jointly satises the
condition B >
p
4=[(1  )]. Moreover, we restrict our analysis to the case of tax
shifting. By denition, tax shifting describes the case where an increase in one tax rate is
coupled with a fall in another tax rate. In an online appendix, we show that when L = ~L2, to
hold a constant proportion of the government spending, the labor tax rate actually increases
in response to an increase in the capital tax rate.13 We rule out this irrelevant case and only
focus on the solution L = ~L1. From (23a), we can derive the relationship:
@ ~L1
@K
=

2
(
@B
@K
+
B@B=@K + 2
2=[(1  2)(1  )2]p
B2   4=[(1  )]
)
> 0 (24)
where @B=@K =  [1   + 2(1  K)=(1  2)] =f(1   )(1   )2g > 0. The result in
equation (24) leads us to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In the case of tax shifting from labor income tax to capital income tax,
raising the capital income tax rate increases the steady-state equilibrium growth rate.
12For notational simplicity, we suppress the argument of (K) and B(K) in the following equations.
13The online appendix is available on the journals homepage.
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It would not be di¢ cult to understand the intuition underlying the positive growth e¤ect
given that we have already shown the importance of equilibrium labor input on economic
growth from previous discussion. In the present case, there are two conicting e¤ects on
labor supply. The rst is the consumption e¤ect that we discussed in Proposition 1; i.e.,
raising the capital tax rate induces the households to lower the investment rate and increase
the consumption rate, which in turn reduces labor supply. The second e¤ect emerges from
the channel of shifting taxes from labor income to capital income. A rise in the capital
income tax rate leads to a reduction in the labor income tax rate, which tends to boost labor
supply. In particular, this latter tax-shifting e¤ect has a more powerful direct impact on the
labor market so that it dominates the former one. As a result, the net e¤ect is positive such
that a higher capital income tax rate stimulates economic growth in the long run.
4 Short-run versus long-run growth e¤ects of capital
taxation: A quantitative analysis
In this section we provide a numerical analysis to contrast the short-run and long-run growth
e¤ects of capital taxation. We rst generalize the utility function as follows:
U =
Z 1
0
e t

lnCt + 
(1  Lt)1 
1  

dt; (25)
where   0 determines the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Equation (25) nests equation
(1) as a special case when  = 0. The model features 7 parameters: f; ; ; K ; ; ; g. We
consider the following standard parameter values in the literature. First, we follow Kydland
and Prescott (1991) to set the discount rate to  = 0:04. Second, Elsby et al. (2013)
estimate that the labor share in the US has fallen to around 0.6, implying that the capital
share  = 0:40. Third, we set the government spending ratio to  = 0:20, which is within the
commonly accepted range in the macroeconomic literature (e.g., Belo et al., 2013; Chen and
Lu, 2013). Fourth, we set  = 1:67, which implies a Frisch labor-supply elasticity of 1.2; see
Chetty et al. (2011).14 Fifth, based on the estimates in McDaniel (2007), the average capital
income tax in the US during the period 1950-2003 is about 29%; thus we set K = 0:29.
Using the baseline parameter values given above, we calibrate the total labor supply to
be one-third (i.e., L = 1=3), giving us the value  = 1:047. Finally, to generate a steady-
state output growth rate of 1.92%, which is the per capita long-run growth rate of the US
economy, we derive  = 0:5015. The parameter values are summarized below.
14We consider a wide range of values for the Frisch labor-supply elasticity from 0.5 to innity and nd
that our nding of contrasting short-run and long-run e¤ects of capital taxation are robust.
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Table 1: Parameter values
    K  
0:04 0:40 0:20 1:67 0:29 1:047 0:5015
Figure 1 presents the growth e¤ects of varying the capital income tax rate from 0 to 0.6.
We can clearly see that, as the capital tax rate increases, the steady-state equilibrium growth
rate increases. From this illustrative numerical exercise, we nd that if the government raises
the capital tax rate from the benchmark value of 29% to a hypothetical value of 50%, the
steady-state equilibrium growth rate increases from 1.92% to 2.07%. The intuition can be
explained as follows. Although an increase in the capital tax rate exerts a negative e¤ect on
economic growth by depressing capital accumulation, it also causes a fall in the labor income
tax rate, which boosts labor supply and thus is benecial to R&D and economic growth. In
the long run, the latter e¤ect dominates. Consequently, the steady-state equilibrium growth
rate increases in response to a rise in the capital income tax rate.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
In the rest of this section, we simulate the transition dynamics of an increase in the
capital income tax rate.15 We consider the case of an increase in the capital income tax rate
by one percentage point (i.e., from 29% to 30%).16 First of all, the higher rate of capital
taxation leads to a decrease in the investment rate and an increase in the consumption rate
as shown in Figures 2 and 3, where investment I = _K.
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 here]
The lower capital-investment rate gives rise to an initial fall in the capital growth rate as
shown in Figure 4, which contributes to an initial fall in the output growth rate as we will
show later. The rise in the consumption rate increases leisure and decreases labor supply
as shown in Figure 5. This decrease in labor supply reduces the amount of factor input
available for R&D. As a result, the growth rate of technology also decreases initially as
shown in Figure 6.
[Insert Figures 4, 5 and 6 here]
Although tax shifting resulting from a higher capital income tax rate gives rise to a
lower labor income tax rate, this e¤ect is weak in the short run. However, it becomes a
15Details of the dynamic system are provided in an online appendix available on the journals homepage.
16In the case of a larger increase in the capital income tax rate, the qualitative pattern of the transitional
paths of variables remains the same. Results are available upon request.
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stronger force in the long run as shown in Figure 7. As a result, labor supply eventually
rises above the original level, which in turn leads to a higher steady-state equilibrium growth
rate of technology. Therefore, the initial drop in the growth rates of output and capital is
followed by a subsequent increase. In the long run, the steady-state equilibrium growth rate
of output is higher than the initial steady-state equilibrium growth rate as shown in Figure 8.
To sum up, the reason for the contrasting short-run and long-run e¤ects of capital taxation
on economic growth is that the consumption e¤ect is stronger (weaker) than the tax-shifting
e¤ect in the short (long) run.
[Insert Figures 7 and 8 here]
5 Extensions
In this section we consider three extensions. In the rst extension, we consider an iso-elastic
utility function to explore the importance of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
In the second extension, we introduce a capital input in the R&D sector. In the third
extension, we separate labor inputs into skilled labor and unskilled labor in the production
sector. Throughout this section, we only consider the situation where a lump-sum tax is
unavailable given that this is the more realistic case.
5.1 Iso-elastic utility function
In dynamic macroeconomic models, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) in
consumption is known to be important in determining the magnitudes of the short-run and
long-run e¤ects of scal policies. To investigate the role of the IES and whether our results
are robust to di¤erent values of this parameter, we consider an iso-elastic utility function
given by:
U =
Z 1
0
e t
[Ct(1  Lt) ]1    1
1   dt; (26)
where  > 0 is the inverse of the IES, and  > 0 represents the relative weight of leisure
in utility. We simulate the transition dynamics in this model with the primary focus on
the e¤ect of the IES. In choosing parameter values, we set the rst group of parameters
f; ; ; Kg to be the same as in Section 4 because they are uncontroversial. In particular,
we choose  = 2 as our benchmark case, which implies an IES in consumption equal to
0.5. This value is consistent with recent empirical estimates; see Guvenen (2006). Then, as
previously, we calibrate the total labor supply to be one-third (i.e., L = 1=3), and thus we
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obtain  = 1:3252. Finally,  = 0:6456 is chosen to target the steady-state output growth
rate of the US economy of 1.92%.
The transition dynamics of the output growth rate with di¤erent values of  are exhibited
in Figure 9. We also perform a robustness check on the parameter regarding the leisure
preference  , as depicted in Figure 10. We can see in Figure 9 that the transition dynamic
e¤ects are quantitatively sensitive to . The consumption e¤ect is weaker in the case where
 = 4 (IES=0.25) and is stronger in the case where  = 0:9 (IES=1.11). However, in all
cases, the contrasting growth e¤ect of capital taxation in the short run and long run is still
present. Moreover, the long-run growth e¤ect of raising the capital income tax is positive,
whereas the short-run growth e¤ect is negative.17 As a consequence, we can conclude that
our results are qualitatively robust to these two parameters.
[Insert Figures 9 and 10 here]
5.2 Allowing for a capital input in the R&D sector
In our baseline model, we assume that innovation uses the labor input alone; i.e., the
knowledge-driven specication of R&D in Romer (1990). However, innovation may also
require a capital input; e.g., the lab-equipment specication of R&D in Rivera-Batiz and
Romer (1991). Hence, in this subsection we extend the baseline model to allow for a capital
input in the R&D sector. In this subsection and the next, our numerical analysis will con-
tinue to use the iso-elastic utility function for its generality. Moreover, we will only focus on
the long-run growth e¤ect of capital taxation in the case of a tax shift from a labor income
tax to a capital income tax. Our goal is to examine the robustness of the positive e¤ect of
capital taxation on long-run growth.
To introduce R&D capital, the innovation function of new varieties is modied as:
_A = KA(ALA)
1 : (27)
where KA is the R&D capital and  2 [0; 1) denotes the capital share or capital intensity in
the R&D sector. We assume that capital inputs are homogeneous in the R&D sector and the
intermediate-goods sector. It is obvious that when  = 0, equation (26) reduces to equation
(12). In the case where  > 0, our baseline model is modied in the following respects.
First, since the R&D sector also uses capital, the capital market clearing condition becomes
K = KA + Ak. Second, the rst-order conditions of the R&D rm are given by:
17The long-run growth e¤ect of capital taxation will become negative only if  is less than around 0.54,
which implies a too-high IES that is not supported by empirical evidence.
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(1  ) _AV = wLA; (28a)
 _AV = rKKA: (28b)
Equation (28b) indicates that _KA=KA = _A=A along the balanced growth path. Compared
to the previous macroeconomy, this extended model has introduced an additional equation
(28b) and an additional endogenous variable KA.
We solve the extended model numerically. Baseline parameter values and functional forms
are identical as in Section 5.1. Our numerical exercise considers three values of the capital
intensity:  = 0 (the benchmark case),  = 0:05 (low capital intensity) and  = 0:15 (high
capital intensity). Figure 11 depicts the results. In contrast to our benchmark model, in the
case of a low (high) intensity of R&D capital, the long-run growth rate and capital taxation
follows an inverted-U (negative) relationship. The main insight here is that our previous
result of the positive e¤ect of capital taxation on long-run growth is valid only when the
capital intensity is su¢ ciently low. The intuition is straightforward. In the case where
innovation needs capital as an input, raising the capital income tax that depresses capital
accumulation brings about an additional adverse e¤ect on innovation and growth. The higher
that the capital intensity becomes, the stronger that this adverse e¤ect will be. When
the capital intensity is su¢ ciently high, the adverse e¤ect along with the aforementioned
consumption e¤ect will outweigh the benecial tax-shifting e¤ect, thereby causing the long-
run growth rate to fall.
[Insert Figure 11 here]
5.3 Di¤erentiated labor inputs
Our baseline model assumes that labor inputs are homogeneous between innovation and
production. Although this setting is standard in the line of the Romer model, some studies,
by contrast, assume that innovation is conducted by high-skilled workers (scientists) while
production uses low-skilled workers; see Acemoglu (2009). This section deals with this
interesting extension.
To this end, we assume that the representative household has one unit of high-skilled
labor and one unit of low-skilled labor. The representative households lifetime utility is
thus given by:
U =
Z 1
0
e t
[Ct(1 Ht) H (1  Lt) L ]1    1
1   dt; (29)
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where Ht is the supply of high-skilled labor and Lt the supply of low-skilled labor.  H
and  L are the weights to leisure for high-skilled and low-skilled workers, respectively. The
budget constraint is:
_K + _a = ra+ (1  K)rKK + (1  L)(wHH + wLL)  C, (30)
where wH and wL denote, respectively, the wages for high-skilled and low-skilled labor.
The R&D sector uses high skilled-labor; the innovation function of new varieties is _A =
AHA with HA denoting the amount of high-skilled labor used for R&D. The nal goods
production uses both high-skilled and low-skilled labor; the production function of nal
goods is specied as:
Y = H1  "Y L
"
Y
Z A
0
xi di; 0  "  1  : (31)
HY and LY denote respectively the high-skilled and low-skilled labor used in the nal goods
sector. Accordingly, the labor market clearing conditions are H = HA +HY for high-skilled
labor and L = LY for low-skilled labor. Clearly, as " = 0, this model reverts to our basic
model with only one type of labor.
We simulate this extended model to examine how the long-run growth rate responds
to an increase in capital taxation. The baseline values of the uncontroversial parameters
f; ; ; K ; g are the same as before. Given these standard values, we redo the calibration
for the new parameters f H ;  L; "g and  in the following manner. First, we calibrate
the total supply of high-skilled labor to be one-third (H = 1=3) to obtain  H = 0:8128.
Similarly, the supply of low-skilled labor that is equal to one-third (L = 1=3) gives us
the value  L = 0:4956. As for the important parameter " representing the share of low-
skilled labor in nal goods production, we calibrate it to match the skill premium of 1.64
(wH=wL = 1:64), which is based on US data for the period 1970-2011 (Angelopoulos et al.,
2015). In that way, we obtain " = 0:249. Lastly, we set  = 0:4011 to generate the long-run
growth rate of the US economy of 1.92%.
The relationship between the long-run growth rate and capital taxation is depicted in
Figure 12, in which we also consider a higher and a lower value of " as a robustness check. We
nd that, in accordance with our previous result, raising the capital tax rate stimulates long-
run growth in this extended model. The intuition can be briey explained as follows. On
the one hand, when an increase in the capital income tax rate leads to a lower labor income
tax rate, LY increases which in turn increases the marginal product of high-skilled labor in
the nal goods sector. Therefore, for a given supply of high-skilled labor, there should be
a reallocation of high-skilled labor from R&D to production. This channel is detrimental
17
to long-run growth. On the other hand, the total supply of high-skilled labor also increases
because of the lower labor income tax rate, which boosts R&D labor and then long-run
growth. Overall, it turns out that the latter e¤ect always outweighs the former e¤ect. As a
consequence, a higher capital tax rate unambiguously stimulates long-run growth.
[Insert Figure 12 here]
6 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the short-run and long-run e¤ects of capital taxation on
innovation and economic growth in the seminal Romer model. Our results can be summarized
as follows. An increase in the capital income tax rate has both a positive tax-shifting e¤ect
and a negative consumption e¤ect on innovation and economic growth. In the long run,
increasing the capital tax rate has a positive e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium growth
rate because the positive tax-shifting e¤ect strictly dominates the negative consumption
e¤ect. However, along the transitional path, increasing the capital tax rate rst decreases
the equilibrium growth rates of technology and output before these growth rates converge to
a higher steady-state equilibrium level. These theoretical implications of capital taxation on
economic growth suggest that an empirical analysis of capital taxation and economic growth
may benet from considering the possibility that the e¤ects of capital taxation change sign
at di¤erent time horizons.
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